Blar i forfatter "Nyseth, Fredrik"

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    • Fitch's paradox and truthmaking: Why Jago's argument remains ineffective 

      Nyseth, Fredrik (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2022-05-02)
      Recently, there have been several attempts to use the kind of reasoning found in Fitch’s knowability paradox to argue for rather sweeping metaphysical claims: Jago (2020) uses such reasoning to argue that every truth has a truthmaker, and Loss (2021) does so to argue that every fact is grounded. This strategy has been criticized by Trueman (2021), who points out that the same kind of reasoning could ...

    • Linguistic Conventionalism and the Truth-Contrast Thesis 

      Nyseth, Fredrik (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2020-05-19)
      According to linguistic conventionalism, necessities are to be explained in terms of the conventionally adopted rules that govern the use of linguistic expressions. A number of influential arguments against this view concerns the ‘Truth-Contrast Thesis’. This is the claim that necessary truths are fundamentally different from contingent ones since they are not made true by ‘the (worldly) facts’. ...

    • Semantic Facts and a Priori Knowledge 

      Nyseth, Fredrik (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017-01-18)
      This paper is a response to a paper by Marcus Giaquinto in which he argues that lexical meaning is moderately indeterminate and that this poses a problem for the linguistic view of a priori knowledge. I argue that accepting the moderate indeterminacy thesis as he presents it is perfectly compatible with both the linguistic view in general and the specific suggestion that some <i>a priori</i> knowledge ...

    • Synonymy and the a priori: A problem for Boghossian's model 

      Nyseth, Fredrik (Journal article; Tidsskriftartikkel; Peer reviewed, 2017-08-03)
      According to Paul Boghossian, some truths are knowable a priori because they are expressed by epistemically analytic sentences. In such cases, understanding the sentence is meant to suffice for justified belief in the proposition it expresses. One alleged route from understanding to justification goes via what Boghossian calls 'the synonymy model'. This article presents a dilemma for this model and ...